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Introduction
Both domesticand international safeguardsefforts,particularly as they pertain to the protectionof nuclear weapons and their components,could benefitfrom the developmentof a techniqueto passivelyestimate the shape and size of containerizedplutoniumassemblies. Especiallyforcooperativeinternationalagreements,e.g., START,the technique developedshould be capableof characterizingthe shape attribute without using prototypicalfemplate measurements, becausethesemaycontain potentiallysensitiveinformationand thereforetypicallycannotbesharedbetweenthepartk ofrheagreement. Furthermore% fbrdomesticsafeguards,currentmeasurementtechniquesthat doperformcomparisons to prototypical templates often suffer from initialization problems. Many of these techniques lack a method to independentlyverifythat the identityof the initial template item is indeedvafkf for subsequentcomparisonsi.e., that the template item is in fact a weaponor component. However,a techniquethat could acmrately estimate the shape and sizeof containerizedplutoniumassemblieswithout using templatecomparisoncouldalso be used to subsequently validate template items and therebysolveat least part of this template inifializafion problem.
The method proposed in this paper could be developed into the desired technology. It is a technique that can potentiallyidenti&containerizedregularshapesofplutonium withoutusinganytemplateforcomparison. Themethod proposeduses the NuclearMaterialsIdentitlcationSystem(NMIS)operatingin passivemode, i.e., withoutanyactive source,to estimate the shape of plutonium assembliesby detectingtheir spontaneousneutron and gamma emissions. Furthermore, the proposedtechniqueis stationary, i.e., the assemblyis not scanned by moving the detectorsrelative to theassemblyto estimate the shape. This featureis particularlydesirablesincea seriousconcernassociatedwithany scanning techniqueis that observationof the scanning processcouldreveal sensitive information,e.g., locationsand sizes. A stationarymeasurementdoes not sufferhorn this weakness.
Subsequently, the fimdarnental features of the proposed technique and its implementation are described. A demonstrativeimplementationof the method wasdevelopedto test its f~ibility. Becauseplutonium wasnot readily available, califomium was used as a surrogate to construct approximate simply-shaped distributed sources of spontaneousfissionneutrons and gammas. The configurationand results of theseproof-of-principleexperimentsare describedand are used to draw conclusionsregarding the potential capabilitiesof the proposedmethod.
Fundamental Features of Pkopased Method
Weapons-gradeplutonium typicallycontainsa substantialfraction of %, a spontaneousfission sourceof neutrons and gammas. Ifit is assumed (as is reasonable)that the% is uniformlydispersedthroughout the plutonium, then the spatial distribution of spontaneousfission sites is congruent to the shape of the assembly. Hen% estimating the distribution of spontaneousfission sites is tantamount to estimating the Aape.
The proposedmethodinfers thespatialdistributionoffissionsites using an array of garnndneutron-sensitive detectorsto acquire simultaneousestimates of the distribution of distances from the fission sites to each detector in the array. In concep~the methodis (somewhat)analogousto the techniqueusedby the global positioning system (GPS) to locate a point in three-dimensionalspace.l The conceptis illustrated in Fig. 1 for a point radiation sourcein a plane definedby three detectors,i.e., for the two-dimensionalcase. An estimate of the distance (Rl,Rz orR3in thefigure)betweenthe point sourceand a given detectordefines a circle aboutthatdetector.The sourcemust lie at the point commonto the three circhx surrounding the detectors. In the threedimensionrd case, each distance estimate defines a sphere around the corresponding,detector such that four detectorsmust be used to locate the sourceat the unique point common to the four spheres surrounding the detectors.
To understand the generalizationof the technique from one that measures the locationofapoint sourcetoonethat measuresthe shapeofa spatiallydistributed sour% recognize that any distributed source is simply a collection of point sources. For example,a sphere (bydefinition) is the locus of points within the volumedefined by the sphere'sradius and center.
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u DETECTOR Figure 1 . The method to estimate the locationof a point source
In order tomeasttre the shapeofa distributedsource,it is necessaryto estimatethedistriburkmofdistancesfrompoints within the sourcevolumeto each detectorin the array. The distributions of distancescan thenk used to estimatethe distribution of fission sites and hence the shape of the plutonium assembly.
Proposed Implementation of Method
Consider that the time it takes a neutron to "fly" from a spontaneous fission to a detector is simply the distance from the fission site to the detectordividedby the neutron's flight-speed. Consequently, thedistributionof neutron flighttimes followingfission, i.e., the neutron time-of-flightspectrum,is congruent to the distribution of flight-speeds(the tission spectrum)convolvedwith the distributionof flight-distances. Hencethe distributionof flight-distancescan be deconvolvedfrom the time-of-flightspectrumifa fission spedrurn is assumed.
Recall that spontaneous(and inducedfission)eventsmay releasemultiple gammas(andneutrons). Notethat because all gammas travel at the speed of light, the real coincidenceof near-simultaneousgammas approximatelymarks the time of fission. Becausegammastravelat roughly300rnrnhs% a coincidencewindowofonlya fewnanosecondscan measuresimultaneitybetweengammascountedin twodetectorsseparatedbya much as a meter. Furthermorebecause fissionneutrons travelat much slowerspeeds(on the order of tens of rnmhsec), relativeto typicalneutronflight-times the near-simultaneousgamma pair can also be regardedas near-instantaneousfollowingthe fission event. Hen% a *Theanalogyis actuallyin revers.q GPSsatellitesemittime-stamped signalsthata GPSreceiver usesto estimatelocation.
[1~] Forthe method to locate a point radiation source, the source is the emitter and each detector acts as a receiver. The analogy lies in both methods' use of intersecting spheres to locate a unique point in space.
simultaneous gamma pair can be used as an approximate"trigger"to measureneutrontime-of-flight. Consequently, the timedistribution ofneutron countsfollowingsimultaneousgammapairs can be usedto estimatethe neutron timeof-flight SpfXtrUm.
There are a number of means to implement a techniqueto measure the time-distributionofneutron counts following simuhaneaus gamma pairs. The proposedmethod uses third-ordercorrelationtechniquesto measurethe distribution of three-waycoincidenceover the relative time-delaysbehveentriplets of detectorchannels.
The third-order coincidencedistribution isthedistributionofthree-way mincident(bicoincident)detectionevmt.soverthedelay712= tz -tl~tieevmt xl(tl) in the first channel and the event x#2) in the secondchannel and tie delay 713= t3 -11 betwmn tie event Xl(tl) in the first channel and the event J5(t3)in the third channeL[31As in the caseof tie s~ond-order distributi~of evmts coincident at a relative delay of~,
some coincidencesare "real,"i.e., are correlated and some coincidencesare "accidental: i.e., are uncorrelated. So, analogous to the covariance that measures the distribution of real two-waycoincidenceover the delay~betweenchannels, the bicovariancẽ
measuresthe distributionof real three-waycoincidenceovertherespectivedelays~12md q3 betweenchmnek 1~d 2 and betweenchannels 1 and 3.
When the bicovarianceis measuredfkoma spontaneousfissionsonrceusingdetectorsthat aresensitivetoboth neutrons and gammas, the followingfour kinds of real bicoincidenttripfets will be observed.
q Gamma-gamma-gammatriplets (G-G-G):three gammas from a single spontaneousfission. q Each count in a G-G-G triplet will tend to occur in rapid successionbecauseeach gamma moves at the speed of light.
q Hencethe time-delaysbetweenindhidual counts in the triplet will be very short (a fewnanoseconds). . Consequently, G-G-G triplets tend to appear as a concentrated"peak"about the (r12,r13)-origin.
q Gamma-gamma-neutrontriplets (G-G-N):two gammas and a neutron from a single spontaneousfission. q The two gammas will alwaysbe counted f~st in sequenceand the neutron will tend to be countedmuch later according to its time-of-flightji.e., the distance from the spontaneousfission site to the detector divided by the neutron's flight-speed.
q Hencethe time-delaybetweenthe two gamma counts will I.wvery short (a fewnanoseconds)and the time-delay followingthe gamma count pair to the neutron count will be distributed (overtens of nanoseconds)accordingto the spontaneousfission prompt neutron spectrum. . ConsWuenUyG-G-Ntriplets appearas "ridges"concentratedalong the ZIz-and 713-axesand along the diagonal Clz =~13< O; the shape of each ridge is congruent to the neutron time-of-fllghtsjedrum.
q Gamma-neutron-neutrontriplets (G-N-N):one gamma and two neutrons from a single spontaneousfission. q The gamma will alwaysbe countedfwstin sequence,and the individualneutrons in the subsequentpair will tend to be countedmuch later accordingto their individual times-of-flight.
q Hencethe time-delaybetweenthe initial gamma count and each subsequentneutron count will tend to be much greater than zero (tens of nanoseconds).
. $.
q ConsequentlyG-N-N triplets appearas "lobes"btween the G-G-Nridgey the shape of each lobe is congruent to the neutron time-of-flightspectrumconvolvedonce with itself. c Neutron-neutron-neutron(N-N-N):three neutrons born a single spontaneousfission.
q Each neutron in the triplet will be counted accordingto its time-of-flightfrom the spontaneousfission site to the detectors.
q Hencethe time-delaysbetweeneach neutron count will distributedaccordingto the dit%rencein the flight-speed of each neutron in the N-N-N triplet.
q ConsequentlyN-N-Ntriplets tend to appear as a broad "bump"centerednear the origin with a shape congruent to the neutron timeof-flight spectrumconvolvedtwicewith itself.
These various "features" are illustrated in Fig. 2 which shows the bicovariance passively measured from a %f source usingthree plastic scintillators (arrangedas depicteditt the graphic). Recognizethat the relative amplitude of each feature is controlled by the &tectors' respective efficiencies for counting neutrons and gammas and by the relative probabilitiesof prompt neutron and gamma emission from spontaneousfissionof %2f. Consequently, despite the fact that these detectors have much higher neutron efficiencies than gammaetliciencies,the distributionofN-N-N tripletsis obscuredbythe moreprominent distributions of triplets involving one or more gammas because 'Wf has a greater propensity for emitting prompt fission gammas (average 7.8 per spontaneous fission) than for emitting prompt fission neutrons (average 3.8 per spontaneous fission). the bicoincidencerate has units of real bicoincidenttriplets/nsec3
As noted in Fig. 3 , each of the three G-G-N ridges measures the time-distributionof neutron counts in the noted detectorcorrelatedwith the real coincidenceof a near-simultaneouspair of gamma counts in the other two detectors.
Alongthe~lz-axis,thenear-simukaneousgammapair "trigger"is countedby detectorpair (1,2)and the subsequent neutron is countedbydetector3. Hence,G-G-Nridge 3 approximatelymeasurestheneutrontime-of-flightspectrum observedby detector3. Along the~1-axis, the near-simultaneousgamma pair trigger is countedby detectorpair (1,3) and the subsequent neutronis countedbydetector2. Hence,G-G-Nridge 2 approximatelymeasurestheneutron time-of-flightspectrum observedby detector2. Along the diagonal~lz = 'C13 s O, the near-simultaneousgamma pair trigger is counted by detectorpair (2,3) and the subsequentneutron is cmnted bydetector1. Hence,G-G-Nridge 1approximatelymeasurestheneutron time-offlight spectrumobservedby detector 1. Fur~er observe that each ridge is "dilated" according to the distance between the source and the corresponding detector.
This dilation occurs for the followingreasons. Prompt neutrons emerge tloru the spontaneousfission source with kinetic energyaccording to the source'sspectrum,and neutrons incident on a given detectorare countedaccording to its' neutrondete$tionefficiency.Hence,the probabilityof countinga promptfissionneutron incidenton the detector is simplythe productof the fission spectrumand thedetectionefficiency theseare both dependentupon the neutron's flight-speed. Because,for a given flight-distance,the neutron flight-timefromthe sourceto the detectoris simply the distance divided by the speed, the time-of-flightspectrum of detected neutrons is dilated by the flight-distance. Consequently,for an assumedspontaneousfissionpromptneutronspectrumand knownneutron detectionefficiency, the time-of-flightspectrumprovidesa means to passivelymeasure the distance from the detectorback to the original spontaneousfission site.z Consequentlythe bicovariancebetweeneach triplet of detectorsprovidesa simultaneousmeasurementof the distance from the sourceto eachdetectorin thetriplet. As the followingproof-of-principlemeasurementsshow, this allowsthe absolute location of a point source to be estimated and the shape and size of a distributed source to be estimated. Becauseplutoniumwasunavailable,'Wf wasusedas a surrogatespontaneousfissionsourceofneutrons and gammas.
Demonstration of Feasibility of linplementation
The first series of measurements, illustrated in Fig. 4 , were performed to test the technique's ability to locate a point sourcein two-dimensional(x, y)-coordinates.Thepoint sourceshownin Fig. 4 wasmovedtomovedto sevendifferent locationsrelative to the array of three plastic scintillators.
o a first-order approximation, thepromptneutron spectra of most spontaneously fissioning and fissionable isotopes are similar enough to yield time-of-flight spectra that are roughly equivalent. [4] Furthermore, the neutron detection efficiency of proton-nxoil detectors can be accurately modeled as s-wave neutron scattering off hydrogen nuclei and can be precisely measured from the time-of-flight spectrum using a Wf ionization chamber as a point neutron source with a known spectrum. [S,6] ACTUAL FLIGHT OISTANCE@m) Figure 5 . Estimateddistances from the sourceto each detectorversus actual distances Figure 5 shows the resulting twenty-oneestimates of flightdistance (one distance to each of three detectors at seven sourcelocations) comparedto the actual flight-distance. All distance estimates were within -27 rum to +13 mm of the actual flight-distance such that the relative error in each estimatewas less than 1170.
The three simultaneousestimatesof flight-distanceat each of the seven source positions were used to solve for the source location in (x, y)-coordinates, aud the resulting estimates of sourcelocation are comparedto the actual location in Fig. 6 . Jn the figure, the detector array is located at the x-origin. Observethat the greatesterrorin the estimatedsourcekxation is 33 mm (root-mean-squaredistance). Consequently, rhe technique is capable of locating a point source. The subsequentproof-of-principlemeasurementswereperformed to implement the generalizationof the method to estimatethe shape and size of a distributed source. x(nun) Figure 6 . Estimated locationsof the sourceversus actual locations
The series of measurements illustrated in Fig. 7 were performedto test the technique'sabilityto distinguishbetween a point sourceand a distributedsourceand to estimatethe size of a distributed source. It was not possible to obtain a continuouslydistributedsource,soring sourcesofspontaneous fission gammas and neutrons were approximated by distributing six %f sourcesaround three circk-s. As shown, thedetectorswerearrangedon a circlewith the diameterofan AT400-Rcontainer,and thesourcesweredistributedoncircles with diametersof 10mm (an approximatepoint source), 160 mm (1/3 the diameter of an AT400-R), and 320 mm (2/3 AT400-Rdiameter).[71 Figure 7 . Measurementsperformedto estimate the Figure 8 depicts the bicovariance measured flom each shape and size of approximatering sources six %f approximatering source. Note that the G-G-Nridges in the sources (the X's) were distributedat a point and 1/3 and 2/3 the diameter of an AT400-Rcontainer Figure 9 comparesthe diameter estimatedfor each ring source to its actual diametep, Observethat the diameter estimated for the point configurationis'approximatelyzero and that the diametersestimated for the 160-mm-and 320-mm-rings deviate from the actual by less than 10mm. Therefore,the techniqueappearsto beable to accurately estima[ethe size of a distributed source. On the basis of theseproofof-principle measurements, the implementation of the proposed method appears f~ible.
Technical Challenges to the Implementation
However, there are still a number of technical challenges to the implementation of the method for application to containerized plutonium assemblies. FirsL the method does rely upon an assumed energy spectrum of neutrons incident on the detectors. For plutonium assemblies that are only weakly self-attenuating and/or selfmuhiplying, the assumption of a spontaneous fission spectrum is probablyadequate. For less transparent sources,it maybe necessary to fwstobtain an initial rough estimate of the shape for an assumed fissionspectrumthat can then be correctedusing a "quick-and-dirty" MonteCarlo (ormaybeevena multi-groupdiffusiontheory)estimateof the actual escapespectrum. Such corrections will probablyhave to be applied iterativelyto incrementallyrefine sequentialestimatesof shape and size. However, simple calculationalmodels can be generated automatically during the analysis of the bicovarianceto maintain a completelyautomatedmeasurementsystem.
A similar difficulty is associated with the effect a container may have on the neutron escape spectrum. Many containers,like the AT400-~are constructedwith a substantialamount of hydrogenousmaterialand thermal neutron absorbers. However, plasticscintillatorsare essentiallyinsensitiveto thermalneutrons, and the hydrogenousmaterial will, to a fwstorderapproximation,simplyreducethe number ofneutrons in the high energyrange (> 1MeV)without significantlychanging the basic shupe of the spectrum in this range. The proposedmethod does not rely upon the absolutenumber of neutrons incident on the detectorsbut only on the energy spectrum of those neutrons. In other words,the shapeestimateforcontainerizedplutoniumismeasuredprincipallyftom the uncollidedneutron fieldwhose spectrumshould remain similar to a fission spectrumin the high energyrange. So container efkcts are expectedto induce errors much less significant than those resulting from self-attenuating and/or self-multiplyingplutonium assemblies. It maybe possibleto similarly compensatefor these errors using simpleautomatedcalculationalmodels.
Conclusions
'lleproposedmethod to infer theshapeand sizeofplutoniumassembliesfiompassivejstationaryNMISmeasurements appears fWsible. The testmeasurementsperformeddemonstratedthat the methodis capableoflocatinga point sourq distinguishing a distributed sourcetlom a point source,and estimating the size of a distributedsource. In particular, the estimates of the diameters of the two approximatering source-s measuredfell within 3% of the actual diameters. This indicates that the technique may be capableof producing estimates of shape and size of containerizedregular shapes of plutonium with,accuraoysufficientfor transparencyor even verificationapplications. The techniquecould thereforebe of significant utility in both domesticand international safeguardsefforts.
